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Abstract—Public intelligent services enabled by machine learn-
ing algorithms are vulnerable to model extraction attacks that
can steal confidential information of the learning models through
public queries [36]. Differential privacy (DP) has been considered
a promising technique to mitigate this attack. However, we find
that the vulnerability persists when regression models are being
protected by current DP solutions. We show that the adversary
can launch a query-flooding parameter duplication (QPD) attack
to infer the model information by repeated queries.
To defend against the QPD attack on logistic and linear
regression models, we propose a novel High-Dimensional Gaus-
sian (HDG) mechanism to prevent unauthorized information
disclosure without interrupting the intended services. In contrast
to prior work, the proposed HDG mechanism will dynamically
generate the privacy budget and random noise for different
queries and their results to enhance the obfuscation. Besides, for
the first time, HDG enables an optimal privacy budget allocation
that automatically determines the minimum amount of noise to
be added per user-desired privacy level on each dimension. We
comprehensively evaluate the performance of HDG using real-
world datasets and shows that HDG effectively mitigates the QPD
attack while satisfying the privacy requirements. We also prepare
to open-source the relevant codes to the community for further
research.
Index Terms—Differential privacy, machine learning, query-
flooding parameter duplication attack, high-dimensional Gaus-
sian mechanism, optimal privacy budget allocation
I. INTRODUCTION
Service providers (SPs) train the machine learning models
with massive data and use them to offer various intelligent
services, such as Azure Cognitive Service [37], Amazon
Textract [1], Google Cloud Vision [3] and Speech [2]. The
trained models are considered critical proprietary assets of
SPs because: 1) the learning model may be trained by a
private dataset. So it is unwise to publish the model without
protection; 2) Training with a large dataset could be costly. SPs
may prefer to keep their models confidential and charge clients
to amortize the cost. Recent work shows that the adversary can
exploit model extraction attacks to infer the internal states of
machine learning models through the public APIs of intelligent
applications [19], [31], [36], [40].
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Fig. 1. Illustration of QPD Attack
Differential privacy (DP) [4], [9], [12], [14], [35], [41]
has been widely recognized as an effective privacy-preserving
technique to defeat the adversarial model extraction attempts.
By adjusting the privacy budget to reflect the users’ privacy
level on each dimension, DP can obfuscate the query results
accordingly. The smaller (larger) the privacy budget is set
for higher (lower) privacy, the lower (higher) accuracy of
the results. However, we find that the existing DP-based
mechanism for regression models cannot withstand the query-
flooding parameter duplication (QPD) attack. Specifically, as
shown in Fig. 1, for an n-dimensional regression model f(x),
the adversary first constructs a query group Q that contains at
least n+ 1 linearly independent queries. The group Q is then
duplicated r times before being sent to the DP-protected APIs
of the services. On receiving the result vectors {y1...yr}, the
adversary can recover the real result vector z ofQ by reducing
the DP noise based on the law of large numbers [23]. In the
end, an inferred model f˜(x) can be derived by analyzing the
query Q and result z.
The root cause of the QPD attack is that a constant privacy
budget is used to generate the identically-distributed noise to
protect the system. So the adversary may recover the true result
by statistic analysis and further infer the model information
(see Sect. IV for attack details). Simply blocking the duplicate
queries is not a practical option. To design an effective DP
mitigation of this devastating attack, we need to answer the
following two challenging questions:
1. How to dynamically set privacy budgets that produce
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uncorrelated noise while satisfying user-desired privacy level
on each dimension.
2. How to automatically set the privacy budgets in an optimal
manner that minimum noise is introduced to meet the privacy
requirements of users? – This has been an open problem
concerning the DP implementation in practice [36].
In this work, we focus on the design of (, δ)-differentially
private linear and logistic regression models and propose a
novel High-Dimensional Gaussian (HDG) mechanism to de-
fend against the powerful QPD attack. To our best knowledge,
HDG is the first DP scheme that can address both of the
mentioned challenges. Under the hood, HDG randomly assigns
the received queries into different query groups. Then it au-
tomatically sets unpredictable privacy budgets for each query
group to produce the noise for QPD mitigation. The HDG
mechanism requires two additional initialization parameters:
Sum of privacy budgets (SPB) s of all dimensions of the
model and the upper bound ρ of the desired distortion degree
Γ. ρ and Γ respectively control the upper and lower bound
of the privacy level on each dimension provided by the HDG
mechanism. We carefully design the privacy budget allocation
algorithm to make it optimal, i.e. generating minimum noise to
satisfy the privacy requirement and increase the model utility,
and resilient to a mistakenly-configured large privacy budget
sum s without significant loss of the desired privacy level.
We experiment to demonstrate the practicality of the QPD
attack and the effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure.
The result shows that HDG outperforms other DP-based
mechanisms in model protection and utility. Our contribution
can be summarized as follows:
New attack vector. We develop a new query-flooding pa-
rameter duplication attack that can be exploited to effectively
infer DP-protected models. We demonstrate its viability for
regression models and discuss the potential harmful impact
on other types of learning models.
Countermeasure against QPD attack. We propose a High-
Dimensional Gaussian (HDG) mechanism to protect the linear
and logistic regression models against the QPD attack. To
this end, HDG can generate the uncorrelated noise for distinct
query groups and their results.
Optimal and resilient privacy budget allocation. For the
first time, we design an automatic privacy budget allocation
algorithm to keep the minimum impact on model utility while
meeting the expectation of privacy preservation. The algorithm
is also insensitive to the misconfiguration of a large privacy
budget to maintain DP functionalities.
Comprehensive evaluation and open source for repro-
ducibility. We develop a prototype system for evaluation. The
result shows the validity of the QPD attack and satisfactory
performance of the proposed countermeasure. To help the
community better understand the new attack and our defense
mechanism, we will publish the relevant source code for
reproducibility and further research explorations.
II. RELATED WORK
We introduce the related work in this section.
A. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is an effective technique to protect the
privacy of valuable information. DP was first introduced by
Dwork et al. [9]. Since then, extensive studies have been
performed to meet different privacy requirements for various
settings [7], [9], [13], [15], [28], [34]. In differential privacy,
how to set the key parameter – privacy budget has been
attracting widely attention. To explore the best way to set
the privacy budget, Kohli et al. [21] designed a chooser
mechanism according to users’ preferences. Naldi et al. [29]
proposed an estimated theory based method to choose privacy
budget for the Laplace mechanism [11]. In [22], Lee et
al. defined a new attack model and analyzed the posterior
probability of privacy leakage to determine the privacy budget.
In [18], the privacy budget is set by using game theory, i.e.
whether data subjects opt-in to a privacy study determines the
privacy budget. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on how to
set the privacy budget as of now [10]. Privacy budget allocation
is a complicated problem, ill-designed methods may result
in flawed DP mechanisms. Li et al. discovered a multi-time
query attack in [23]. If an adversary sends the same queries
many times, he can infer the true results with a certain degree
of confidence. They also proved that many shared DP-based
mechanisms are insecure from the perspective of information
theory when the number of queries is larger than 3. It is the
problem that we solve in this paper.
B. Model Extraction Attack
Tramer et al. proposed model extraction attack for many
machine learning models (e.g. logistic regression, decision
tree, SVM and neural network) in literature [36]. Since that,
many researchers focus on how to make model extraction
attack more effective and efficient. Papernot et al. proposed
a Jacobin based synthetic data augmentation technology [31]
to train a synthetic DNN model and they proved this attack is
practical for adversaries with no knowledge about the model.
Juuti et al. proposed a new model extraction attacks [19]
using novel approaches for generating synthetic queries and
optimizing training hyperparameters. Shi et al. proposed an
exploratory model extraction attack [40] by deep learning
that can steal functionalities of Naive Bayes models and
SVM classifiers with high accuracy. Duddu et al. [8] infer
the depth of neural network using timing side channels and
used reinforcement learning based optimization to accelerate
the extraction process. Wang et al. proposed hyperparameter
stealing attacks [38] for both non-kernel models and kernel
models with the help of zero gradient technology.
Due to lack of DP-based mechanisms for model extraction
attacks, existing model extraction attacks concentrate on var-
ious machine learning models. We propose a new effective
QPD attack for DP-protected regression models.
C. Resistance to Model Extraction Attack
In order to defend model extraction attack, Zheng et al.
proposed boundary differentially private layer (BDPL) [41]
to defend model extraction attack for binary classifier. This is
the only DP-based work resisting model extraction attack. Un-
fortunately, they do not deliberate the privacy budget setting,
and the extraction rate will be near 90% when the number
of queries is large. Besides BDPL, Kesarwani et al. proposed
model extraction monitor [20] that quantifies the extraction
status of models by continually observing the API queries and
response streams of users to defend model extraction attack.
Quiring et al. [33] mitigate model-extraction attacks with the
closeness-to-the-boundary concept in digital watermarking.
We solve the problem in previous DP-based mechanism and
for the first time propose a dynamic privacy budget allocation
in our HDG mechanism to mitigate the QPD attack.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Let X be a training dataset containing m tuples
(x(1), y(1)), (x(2), y(2)), ..., (x(m), y(m)). The i-th tuple
(x(i), y(i)) includes n + 1 explanatory attributes (or
“dimensions”, “features”) x(i)1 , x
(i)
2 , ..., x
(i)
n , y(i), where
(x
(i)
1 , x
(i)
2 , ..., x
(i)
n ) is the input of the regression model f(x)
and y(i) is the predicted value (or called “label” in logistic
regression) corresponding to the x(i). Based on the above
notations we introduce the necessary preliminary knowledge
used in this work. We use ”dimension” or ”feature” instead
”attribute”, and use ”label” instead ”predicted value” for
logistic regression.
A. Linear Regression
Definition 1 (Linear Regression). An n-dimensional linear
regression model trained on dataset X is a prediction function
which returns the predicted value
f(x) = aTx+ b (1)
where a ∈ Rn and b ∈ R are coefficients that minimize the
cost function J(a, b) = 12m
m∑
i=1
(
y(i) − aTx(i) − b)2 .
B. Logistic Regression
Definition 2 (Logistic Regression). An n-dimensional logistic
regression model trained on dataset X is a prediction function
which returns 1 with probability
f(x) =
1
1 + e−(aTx+b)
(2)
where a ∈ Rn and b ∈ R are coefficients that minimize the
cost function
J(a, b)
= −
m∑
i=1
[
y(i) log f(x(i)) + (1− y(i)) log (1− f(x(i)))
]
C. (, δ)-Differential Privacy
Differential privacy provides a privacy guarantee indepen-
dent of adversaries with any background knowledge. Formally,
Definition 3 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy [9]). A randomized
algorithm M satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy iff for a pair
of neighbor datasets X and X ′ which only differ in one tuple,
randomized algorithm M satisfies the following equation:
Pr[M(X ) ∈ S] ≤ e × Pr[M(X ′) ∈ S] + δ (3)
where  is privacy budget and S is any subset of the range of
M.
In differential privacy, privacy budget  is often set to be
a small real number such as 1 or ln 2, and δ is set to be the
inverse of any polynomial in the size of dataset, so it could be
regarded as a constant when the dataset is known. When the
 reduces, all of the data in dataset X become almost equally
likely. Thus, the smaller the privacy budget  is, the higher
privacy level the mechanisms provides.
Differential privacy mechanisms are often required to cali-
brate the noise to global sensitivity. For different design, global
sensitivity includes but not limited to `1 global sensitivity and
`2 global sensitivity. In this paper, we only introduce the `2
global sensitivity that is used in our mechanism.
Definition 4 (`2 Global Sensitivity [11]). For a function f :
X → Rn, X and X ′ are a pair of neighbor datasets that only
differ in one element. The `2 global sensitivity ∆2f is defined
as:
∆2f = maxX ,X ′
‖f(X )− f(X ′)‖2 (4)
From the perspective of differential privacy theory, global
sensitivity of a function f captures the maximum distance by
which a single tuple in the dataset can change the function f in
the worst case. In addition, global sensitivity is independent
of the dataset, it only relates to query function itself. Our
mechanism is based on Gaussian mechanism [12].
Definition 5 (Gaussian Mechanism [12]). Gaussian mecha-
nism is a (, δ)-DP-based mechanism. For a function f : X →
Rn, Gaussian mechanism M injects Gaussian noise N into
f(X ) to protect privacy. Formally,
M(X ) = f(X ) +N = N (f(X ), σ2) (5)
where σ ≥
√
2 ln ( 1.25δ )× ∆2f .
D. Multivariate Gaussian Distribution
Definition 6 (Multivariate Gaussian Distribution). An n-
dimensional random vector X follows multivariate Gaussian
distribution N (µ,Σ) if it has the density function:
fX(x1, ..., xn) =
exp(− 12 (X − µ)TΣ−1(X − µ))√
(2pi)n|Σ| (6)
where µ ∈ Rn is the mean vector of X , and Σ ∈ Rn×n is the
covariance matrix.
TABLE I
EFFECTIVENESS OF QPD ATTACK
Datasets for linear regression (EMSE) Datasets for logistic regression (ER)
Forestfires GeoOriginal UJIIndoor Mushroom Iris Bank
Query Size 1k 0.6 0.014 0.48 0.61 0.62 0.67
Query Size 5k 0.6 0.014 0.47 0.75 0.81 0.85
Query Size 10k 0.59 0.015 0.47 0.81 0.88 0.88
Query Size 15k 0.56 0.014 0.46 0.82 0.84 0.86
Query Size 20k 0.54 0.013 0.46 0.88 0.88 0.88
Multivariate Gaussian is widely generated by transforma-
tions based on the variance-covariance matrix [16].
IV. QUERY-FLOODING PARAMETER DUPLICATION ATTACK
In this section, we introduce the query-flooding parameter
duplication attack. The QPD attack can be exploited to extract
the coefficients of the logistic/linear regression models that
are being protected by the state-of-the-art DP mechanisms
[41]. We assume that the adversary can access all public APIs
provided by the data owner.
Logistic and linear regression models are essentially linear
equations. It is possible for an adversary to extract an n-
dimensional logistic or linear regression model by querying the
public APIs n+ 1 times [36]. The QPD attack can be carried
out by combining the naı¨ve equation-solving model extraction
attack with the multi-time query attack [23]. In a nutshell,
given a DP-protected linear or logistic regression model f(x),
we create n+1 linearly independent queries denoted by Query
Matrix Q. Next, we duplicate each query qj ∈ Q r times and
get the duplicated query matrix Qd. According to the law
of large numbers, the larger the r is, the more similar the
extracted models are to the original models. In practice, we
often choose a large number r and the probability of obtaining
the true results is 1−O( 1r ). Then, we send the query Qd to
the model f(x) and get the results Y . Because each query
qj ∈ Q is duplicated r times, each query qj ∈ Q corresponds
to r different perturbed results {y(j)i }ri=1 ∈ Y . Finally, we can
solve the n+ 1 coefficients a1, ..., an and b based on the law
of large numbers and the Cramer’s rule. The detailed process
of the QPD attack is shown as follows.
Initially, we estimate the true result z(j) for each query qj ∈
Q according to the law of large numbers,
z(j) =
1
r
r∑
i=1
y
(j)
i . (7)
Second, given the true result z(j) for each qj , we have n+ 1
equations denoted by the augmented matrix QA.
QA = (Q|z)
=

x
(1)
1 · · · x(1)k · · · x(1)n 1 z(1)
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
...
x
(n+1)
1 · · · x(n+1)k · · · x(n+1)n 1 z(n+1)

where x(j)k is the value in the k-th dimension of the j-th query
qj . Then we replace the k-th column of query matrix Q with
the column z to construct the k-Result Matrix Qk.
Qk =

x
(1)
1 · · · z(1) · · · x(1)n 1
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
x
(n+1)
1 · · · z(n+1) · · · x(n+1)n 1

Finally the coefficient can be solved by the Cramer’s rule
ak =
det(Qk)
det(Q)
=
|Qk|
|Q| , b =
det(Qn+1)
det(Q)
=
|Qn+1|
|Q| , k ≤ n.
The QPD attack is shown in the Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 QPD Attack
Input: DP-protected n-dimensional regression model f(x)
Output: Extracted n-dimensional regression model f˜(x)
1: Construct a query matrix Q containing n + 1 linearly
independent queries qj
2: for each qj ∈ Q do
3: Duplicate qj r times
4: end for
5: Send the duplicated query matrix Qd to f(x) and get the
results Y
6: for each {y(j)i }ri=1 ∈ Y corresponding to qj ∈ Q do
7: z(j) = 1r
r∑
i=1
y
(j)
i
8: end for
9: Construct column vector z = [z1, z2, ..., zn+1]T
10: for k ≤ n do
11: Construct k-result matrix Qk by replacing the k-th
column in Q by z
12: ak =
|Qk|
|Q|
13: end for
14: b = |Qn+1||Q| , a = [a1, a2, ..., an]
15: return f˜(x) = aTx+ b
Attack efficacy. We highlight the main evaluation results of
the QPD attack and defer the detailed discussion to SectionVI.
We launch the QPD attack on unprotected linear regression
models and BDPL-protected logistic regression models be-
cause BDPL is the only DP-based mechanism against model
extraction attack in this context. We use real-world datasets
[6] (see Section VI) to evaluate the attack. The main results
are shown in Tab. I. In particular, we measure the utility
of the extracted models to assess the performance of the
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Fig. 2. Workflow of HDG mechanism
QPD attack. High utility of the extracted models represents
the high effectiveness of the QPD attack. We use Extraction
Mean Squared Error (EMSE) and Extraction Rate (ER) to
measure the similarity between the extracted models and the
original models. Smaller RMSE and higher RE indicate higher
similarity of the extracted models. Table I shows that the the
efficacy of the QPD attack. On all of the datasets, the similarity
increases with the growth of r, which means the QPD attack
is more effective as the r grows.
Albeit the QPD attack is shown to be effective for linear
and logistic regression models, it could be applied to other
machine learning models, such as multiclass logistic regression
model and multilayer perceptrons. Because these models are
constructed by some equations. The equations are non-linear
however, query-flooding can still impair the protection of
differential privacy and allows adversaries to infer the true
results corresponding to his queries. Thus adversaries can steal
the models by constructing the equations about the model
coefficients to solve or adapting the model implementations
for equation-solving model extraction attack.
V. HIGH-DIMENSIONAL GAUSSIAN MECHANISM
In this section, we first overview the HDG mechanism and
then describe the details of the proposal. We summarize the
notations used in HDG in Table II.
A. Overview
QPD attack uses the law of large numbers to reduce the
obfuscation produced by probability based differential privacy
technology. The key to mitigate the QPD attack is making the
data follow correlated and nonidentical distributions. Consid-
ering this, we propose a High-dimensional Gaussian (HDG)
mechanism to mitigate the powerful QPD attack. In order to
solve the first challenge that how to dynamically set privacy
budgets that produce uncorrelated noise while satisfying user-
desired privacy levels for each dimension, we use grouping
strategy and generate the optimal privacy budget for different
queries under user-desired privacy levels for each dimension.
As for the second challenge, referring to differential entropy,
we construct and solve the optimization problem about the
TABLE II
TABLE OF NOTATIONS
Notation Description
s Sum of privacy budgets (SPB) on all dimensions
i Privacy budget for the i-th dimension
n
The number of dimensions of the
model
Q ∈ Rm×n All received queries, where m is the numberof queries and n is the number of features
Qi ∈ R(n+1)×n
The i-th query group (matrix) after random
arrangement, which contains n+ 1 n-dimensional
queries
Qki the k-Result matrix for Qi
q(j) ∈ Qi The j-th query vector in Qi
f(x) Original linear or logistic regression model
Σ Covariance matrix in HDG mechanism
Γ Set of all distortion degree for model f(x)
Γi ∈ Γ Distortion degree on the i-th dimension of f(x)
ρ Upper bound of the distortion degree
∆2f `2 global sensitivity of f(x)
z(i) ∈ z the result corresponding to the i-th query q(i)
privacy budget such that the generated noise is minimum. The
Algorithm 2 describes the HDG mechanism.
Concretely, HDG mechanism executes the following steps.
We address the first challenge in the Step 2, 3, 4, and the
second challenge is addressed in the Step 5.
1. Initialization. Before the execution of the HDG mecha-
nism, `2 global sensitivity is hard-coded into the HDG
mechanism. Then data administrators set the initialization
parameters SPB s and the upper bound ρ of the distortion
degree for the HDG mechanism (Section V-B).
2. Generate Query Groups Qi. After receiving the queries
Q from all users, HDG mechanism normalizes them and
randomly arrange all queries into different groups Qi with
size n+ 1. If the number of queries is not enough to form
a group, HDG mechanism generates some random padding
queries to pad users’ queries as an entire query group.
3. Calculate Distortion Degree set Γ for the Model f(x).
In this step, HDG mechanism uses ρ, relative error and
feature selection algorithms (e.g. RFECV) to calculate the
distortion degree Γi ∈ Γ for the i-th dimension of the model
f(x). This allows the HDG mechanism to construct the
Algorithm 2 High-Dimensional Gaussian Mechanism
Input: n-dimensional queries Q; n-dimensional linear or
logistic regression model f(x); SPB s; upper bound ρ
of distortion degree
Output: HDG-protected result fˆ(Q)
1: Normalize and randomly arrange the received queries Q
into different query groups Q1,Q2, ... with size n+ 1.
2: if The size of Qi < n+ 1 then
3: Generate random padding queries for Qi such that the
size is n+ 1.
4: end if
5: Calculate distortion degree Γ for all dimensions in the
model based on ρ
6: Construct two types of privacy budget constraints for all
query groups Qi based on the distortion degree Γ and
SPB s
7: for each query group Qi do
8: Solve the optimal privacy budget  under the privacy
budget constraints
9: for each query q(j) ∈ Qi do
10: Based on the , generate (n+ 1)-dimensional Gaus-
sian noise vector Ni
11: Split Nj = [N
input
j , N
output
j ].
12: q(j)∗ := q(j) +N inputj
13: f ′(q(j)) = f(q(j)∗) +Noutputj
14: end for
15: f ′(Qi) =
⋃
j
f ′(q(j))
16: end for
17: return f ′(Q) =
⋃
i
f ′(Qi)
privacy budget constraints later. The distortion degree set
Γ is used to limit the lower bound of the magnitude of the
noise generated by the privacy budgets on each dimension.
4. Construct Privacy Budget Constraints for every Query
Group. In this step, HDG mechanism constructs two types
of privacy budget constraints on each dimension in query
group Qi, referring to s, Γi ∈ Γ, Cramer’s rule and
Hadamard’s inequality. The two types of constraints sepa-
rately limit the privacy budgets from the perspective of the
utility and security.
5. Solve the Optimal Privacy Budget. In this step, HDG
mechanism solves the optimal privacy budgets for each
query group Qi under the privacy budget constraints in
Step 4. Here ”optimal” means the solved privacy budgets
make the generated noise minimum while satisfying the
constraints.
6. Return Query Results. For each query group Qi ∈ Q,
the HDG mechanism uses the optimal privacy budget
to generate (n + 1)-dimensional noise vectors Nj =
[N inputj , N
output
j ], where the N
input
j is for query qj ∈ Qi,
and the Noutputj is injected into the f(qj +N
input
j ) before
returning them to the users.
We prove that the HDG mechanism satisfies the differential
privacy in the Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. HDG mechanism satisfies (, δ)-differential pri-
vacy, where  = Σni=1i, δ = Σ
n
i=1δi, i and δi are parameters
allocated in the i-th dimension of the model.
Proof. The projection of the multivariate Gaussian noise in
each dimension is an one-dimensional Gaussian distribution.
So the HDG mechanism satisfies (i, δi)-differential privacy in
the i-th dimension. According to sequential composition [26],
HDG satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy where  =
n
Σ
i=1
i and
δ = Σni=1δi.
Security. The HDG mechanism guarantees the following
security properties.
• HDG mechanism can defend against the QPD at-
tack while keeping the utility of the model. This
is because the two types of privacy budget constraints
allow the HDG mechanism to solve the optimal privacy
budgets while satisfying the desired privacy level on
each dimension. Besides, the privacy budgets and noise
are dynamically generated every time, it is difficult for
adversaries to predict and reduce the noise.
• HDG is resilient to misconfigured SPB. In differential
privacy, larger privacy budget provides lower privacy
level. However, the HDG mechanism mitigates this prob-
lem by ensuring the solved privacy budgets are under
the two types of privacy budget constraints even if a
misconfigured SPB is set initially.
B. Global Sensitivity
In general, calculating global sensitivity is an NP-hard
problem [30]. However, we prove that the `2 global sensitivity
∆2f for both liner and logistic regression models is a constant.
Then we can hard-code ∆2f into the HDG mechanism so
that it is not necessary to calculate it again. We solve the
∆2f for linear and logistic regression simultaneously, because
these models are essentially linear functions with an iden-
tical form. Linear regression models can be represented as:
f(x) = aTx+b; logistic regression models can be represented
as: −ln( 1f(x) − 1) = aTx + b. Hence, both models can be
written as h(x) = aTx + b. So we only need to solve the
∆2f on this linear function. The proof is simple. Specifically,
we first create a pair of neighbor training datasets X and X ′
such that the ∆2f = maxX ,X ′
‖fX (x)− fX ′(x)‖, where fX (x)
and fX ′(x) are the models trained by the datasets X and
X ′. Then we can get the analysis formulas of the two linear
models, given which we can derive the `2 global sensitivity
∆2f . Theorem 2 shows that ∆2f for both linear and logistic
regression models is equal to a constant
√
3.
Theorem 2. Let X and X ′ be two normalized n-dimensional
neighbor training datasets. Let fX (x) and fX ′(x) be linear
or logistic regression models trained on the dataset X and X ′.
Then the `2 global sensitivity ∆2f is
√
3.
Proof. See Appendix A.
C. Distortion Degree and Privacy Level
In our scheme, we regard the injected noise and the original
model f(x) as the HDG-protected model f ′(x). By this way,
we use relative error between the coefficients in the f ′(x) and
f(x) to define the privacy level and distortion degree. The
privacy level is defined as follows.
Definition 7 (Privacy Level). Given the original linear or
logistic regression model f(x), the corresponding HDG-
protected model f ′(x), the privacy level on the i-th dimension
is ∣∣∣∣ai − a′iai
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣1− a′iai
∣∣∣∣ (8)
where ai and a′i are the coefficients of the i-the dimension of
the f(x) and f ′(x) respectively.
Larger relative error leads to larger obfuscation, and the
privacy level thus is higher. Hence the above definition is
reasonable. Given this definition, we find that privacy level
is determined by a
′
i
ai
. Thus, we define this item as distortion
degree Γi. Formally,
Definition 8 (Distortion Degree). Given the privacy level∣∣∣1− a′iai ∣∣∣ for the i-th dimension, the distortion degree Γi is
defined by:
Γi =
a′i
ai
(9)
By Definition 8, we find that the closer the Γi is to 1, the
lower the privacy level is. This is reasonable in that when Γi
is approaching 1, a′i gets closer to ai. When Γi = 1, a
′
i equals
to ai, thus no privacy being provided at all.
The distortion degree Γi in our design is adopted as a
measurement of the lower bound of the magnitude of the
noise. It indicates the minimum noise magnitude required to
achieve the privacy level. As the privacy level is defined as
an absolute value, the domain of distortion degree Γi can be
split into two equivalent parts: [−∞, 1] and [1,∞], from the
perspective of privacy level. Because for any Γi ∈ [−∞, 1]
that makes privacy level |1− Γi| = m, there always exists
another Γ′i ∈ [1,∞] that also makes |1− Γ′i| = m. As a
result, we only discuss Γi ∈ [1,∞] in this paper for ease of
demonstration.
Initialization for Distortion Degree. Next, we describe a
conservative approach to set Γi for each dimension. First, we
use feature selection algorithms (e.g. RFECV [24]) to score
each dimension of the model according to their importance.
Thus we algebraically transform the score to domain [1,∞] as
the distortion degree. In practice, an infinite distortion degree
is unreasonable, so we need to set an upper bound ρ for Γi.
Given a group of scores, we generate a function to map the
scores to the range [1, ρ]. In the HDG mechanism, a larger ρ
represents a higher distortion degree and makes our scheme
provide a higher privacy level. The mapping function is as
follows
Γi = ρ− ρ− 1
smax − smin × (si − smin) (10)
where si is the score for the i-th dimension, and smax and smin
denote the maximum and the minimum respectively in the
group of scores. For example, if ρ = 3 and a group of scores
is [0.1, 0.7, 0.9], then the distortion degree Γ = [1, 2.5, 3].
D. Privacy Budget Constraints for Each Dimension
In what follows, we discuss how to construct the privacy
budget constraints for each query group Qk in terms of utility
and security. We propose the Type I privacy budget constraints
for utility by analyzing the impact of privacy budgets on the
utility of the model and the Type II privacy budget constraints
for security by analyzing the impact of privacy budgets on
adversaries.
1) Type I Privacy Budget Constraints: we construct the
Type I privacy budget constraints by quantifying the similarity
between the HDG-protected model f ′(x) and the original
model f(x). The more similar f ′(x) is to the f(x), the
more utility f ′(x) has. The main idea is that we estimate
the coefficient a′i in the f
′(x) and ai in f(x), then we make
the ratio of a′i to ai is larger than Γi. We let Ni denote the
noise matrix injected into the query matrix Qi, and NkRi
be the noise matrix injected into the k-Result matrix Qki .
According to the Cramer’s rule, the k-th coefficient in the
HDG-protected model f ′(x) is |Q
k
i +N
kR
i |
|Qi+Ni| . Then we can get
the privacy budget constraints by solving the bound of this
item. However, because noise matrix Ni and NkRi contain
unknown items σi, directly solving the analysis formula of the
determinant of the sum of the two matrices costs exponential
time [32]. Therefore, we propose a conservative approach to
estimate the bound.
Initially, we find that for any two matrices A and B whose
entries are the same order of magnitude, the determinant
|A| is closer to the determinant |A+B| with the increased
order of magnitude of matrix A. Thus, we can estimate∣∣Qki +NkRi ∣∣ ≈ ∣∣Qki ∣∣ and |Qi +Ni| ≈ |Qi| by intentionally
enlarging the matrices Qi and Qki . On the other hand, we
cannot enlarge the order of the magnitude infinitely because
the noise is designed to match the normalized queries in our
scheme. If the query matrices are enlarged too much, the noise
will mismatch the queries and the mismatching degree will
increase as the order of magnitude grows. Therefore, we need
to find the minimum enlarging order of magnitude when the
estimated error is negligible. In practice, we enlarge the matrix
by 3 orders of magnitude, because the relative error of the
estimated determinant is only a few tenths and independent
of the dimensionality of the matrix. Fig. 3 shows an example
indicating that our estimation is practical. It illustrates that the
relative error of the estimated matrices is less than 0.13 for
all matrices under 100-dimensional. The Theorem 3 shows the
Type I privacy budget constraints.
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Theorem 3. In the HDG mechanism, given a distortion degree
Γi, a query matrix Qk, and the original linear or logistic
regression model f(x). The Type I privacy budget constraints
on the i-th dimension in Qk are as follows:
ai × Γi ≤
√√√√ n∑
q=2
[
zˆ(q) − zˆ(1) + 6σz
]2× (11)
n∏
p=1,p6=i
√∑n
q=2
[
xˆ
(q)
p − xˆ(1)p + 6σp
]2
∣∣∣Qˆk∣∣∣
where Qˆk is obtained by enlarging the entries in Qk by 3
orders of magnitude, and xˆ and zˆ are entries in matrix Qˆk.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Since each projection in HDG is a Gaussian mechanism, we
can substitute σi =
√
2ln 1.25δ × ∆2fi into Equation (11) and
get the Type I privacy budget constraints. Note that although
we analyze the privacy budget constraints on the enlarged
query matrices, the noise can still protect the original queries
against the QPD attack. This is because the noise generated by
Type I privacy budget constraints is negligible for the enlarged
queries.
2) Type II Privacy Budget Constraints: We construct the
Type II privacy budget constraints by quantifying the similarity
between the coefficients of the original model f(x) and those
of the extracted model f˜(x). The lower the similarity is, the
better protection the HDG mechanism provides. The idea is
that we estimate the coefficient a˜i in f˜(x) and make the
ratio of a˜i to ai is larger than Γi. There is a difference
between coefficient a′i and a˜i: adversaries can only obtain the
perturbed results and his queries when extracting models, and
the extracted i-th coefficient is thus a˜i =
|Qki +Nki |
|Qi| , where
Nki is a noise column vector on the k-th dimension of Q
k
i .
Theorem 4 gives the Type II privacy budget constraints as
follows.
Theorem 4. In the HDG mechanism, given a distortion degree
Γi, a query matrix Qk, and the original linear or logistic
regression model f(x). The Type II privacy budget constraints
on the i-th dimension in Qk are as follows:
ai × Γi ≤
∑n
j=1
(
z(j) + 3σz
)×Mji
|Qk| (12)
where Mji is the (j, i) minor of the original query matrix
Qk.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Similarly, we can substitute
√
2 ln 1.25δ × ∆2fi into Equation
(12) and get the Type II privacy budget constraints. Thus,
given a sum of all privacy budgets s, we constrain the privacy
budgets as Equations (13) and (14).
s = z +
n∑
i=1
i (13)
Next, we propose an algorithm to optimize the privacy budgets
to introduce minimum noise while satisfying the two types of
constraints.
E. Optimizing Privacy Budget
There exist many solutions of  that meet the constraints
(13) and (14) and not all of the solutions lead to minimum
noise. To solve this problem, we measure the magnitude of
the multivariate Gaussian noise via differential entropy [27].
We find that the variance of all ’s determines the magnitude
of the noise. Theorem 5 proves that the noise is minimum
when the variance of all ’s is minimum.
Theorem 5. Given the SPB, the noise is minimum when the
variance of all ’s is minimum.
Proof. The proof is shown in the Appendix D.
Consequently, finding the minimum multivariate Gaussian
noise is equal to finding a solution of ’s whose variance is
minimum under the constraints (13) and (14). So we convert
this problem to an optimization problem, and the objective
function is V ar(1, ..., n). We formulate the optimization
problem in Equation (15).
Algorithm 3 Privacy budget optimization
Input: Objective function f , constraint functions h and g
Output: Optimal solution of ’s
1: 25 groups of ’s are chosen randomly from the search
space as the initial population
2: for round ≤ 150 do
3: Generate fitness function F = F (f, h, g) by penalty
factor Mi
4: Use F to fitness each group of 
5: Based on roulette selection, produce the next generation
of groups of ’s
6: end for
7: return The solution of the optimal ’s
To solve this constrained optimization problem, we adopt
global optimization algorithms (e.g. genetic algorithm) instead
of local optimization algorithms. The reason is that the non-
linear extent of the constraints is too high, so the solutions
are subject to converging to the local optimal points in local
optimization algorithms, which causes large noise and poor
utility. In the genetic algorithm, we use the following common
initialization settings:
• Set encoding mode of the solutions to be binary coding.
• Set fitness function to be V ar(1, ..., n) with penalty
function. The fitness function will be discussed later.
• Set selection mode to be roulette wheel.
• Set genetic operator to be uniform crossover.
• Set mutation mode to be uniform mutation.
ai × Γi ≤ min

√∑n
q=2
[
z(q) − z(1) + 6σz
]2 n∏
p=1,p6=i
√∑n
q=2
[
x
(q)
p − x(1)p + 6σp
]2
∣∣∣Qˆk∣∣∣ ,
∑n
j=1(z
(j)
i + 3σz)×Mji
|Qk|
 (14)
min f(1, ..., n, z) = V ar(1, ..., n, z)
s.t. g0(1, ..., n, z) = s − z −
n
Σ
i=1
i = 0
gi(1, ..., n, z) =
aiΓi −min

√
n∑
q=2
[
z(q) − z(1) + 6σz
]2 n∏
p=1,p6=i
√
n∑
q=2
[
x
(q)
p − x(1)p + 6σp
]2
|De| ,
∑n
j=1(z
(j)
i + 3σz)×Mji
|D|
 ≤ 0
(15)
Now we explain our fitness function. The fitness function
controls the probability that a solution is selected to generate
the next solution. It is easier to choose the solution if its
fitness function is higher. In order to remove the solutions
that do not satisfy the constraints, we resort to the penalty
function [39]. The penalty function is used to convert the
constrained optimization problems to unconstrained versions,
whose solutions, in turn, can converge to the solutions of the
original constrained optimization problems. In particular, we
multiply each constraint function h and gi by a penalty factor
Mi to reduce the fitness of the solutions that do not satisfy
the constraints. Then, these solutions will be eliminated in the
next generation. The penalty factor M is defined as follows:
Mi =
{
0, ′s satisfies the i-th constraints gi
− inf, otherwise
In theory, M should be infinite, but in reality, Mi is often
set to be a large number, such as 106 or 107. So the fitness
function can be written as:
f +
n∑
i=0
Mi × gi (16)
We set the size of the initial population to be 25 and set the
number of iteration to be 150 because in this setting Algorithm
3 reaches the trade-off between the performance and efficiency
in our experiment.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate the effectiveness of HDG-protected linear and
logistic regression models against the QPD attack. Then we
compare the utility and the security of ours with other existing
work under the same attack. We also study the impact of the
SPB s and upper bound ρ on the proposed HDG mechanism.
A. Setup
TABLE III
DATASETS
Dataset #Instances #Number of Dimension Type
Iris 100 4
ClassificationMushroom 8124 22
Bank 45210 16
Forestfires 517 13
RegressionGeoOriginal 1059 68
UJIIndoor 21048 529
Datasets and Machine Learning Models. Six datasets from
UCI machine learning repository [6] are used in our experi-
ment – Iris, Mushroom and Bank for the logistic regression
model and Forestfires, GeoOriginal and UJIIndoorLoc for the
linear regression model. All the datasets are split into 70% for
training and 30% for test. All categorical items are encoded
by one-hot-encoding [17]. Missing values are replaced by
the mean of this attribute, which is a common and effective
method in this situation. One-hot-encoding does not need
to assume that the machine learning models understand the
order among the dimensions of the models, which improves
the performance of the model by eliminating the redundant
order information. We also normalize the datasets before
model training because the proposed HDG is restricted for
normalized data. The information about the datasets are listed
in Table III.
QPD Attack. In order to evaluate our protection scheme, we
launch the QPD attack to HDG-protected linear and logistic
regression models. In the attack, the fine-tuned queries are
constructed using the methods described in [25], [36]. The
queries are linearly independent and the distribution of queries
is correlated to training datasets. By this way, and we can thus
use as few as possible queries to effectively extract models.
Evaluation Metrics. We use the following evaluation metrics
in our experiment.
• Accuracy measures the proportion of the correct clas-
sification results for the logistic regression model. It
indicates the utility of the model from users’ perspective.
Formally, given the logistic regression model f(x), the
number of tuples m, the i-th tuple x(i) and the corre-
sponding label y(i),
Accuracy =
1
m
×
m∑
i=1
I
(
f(x(i)) = y(i)
)
(17)
where I is an indicator function that equals 1 if f(x(i)) =
y(i), otherwise 0.
• Mean square error (MSE) indicates the utility of the
linear regression model. Specifically, it measures the
average squared error between the results returned by the
HDG-protected model f ′(x) and the true results returned
by the original model f(x). In general, a lower MSE
represents higher model utility. Formally, given the linear
regression model f(x), the number of tuples m, the i-th
tuple x(i) and the corresponding predicted value y(i),
MSE =
1
m
×
m∑
i=1
(
f ′(x(i))− y(i)
)2
(18)
• Extraction Rate (ER) measures the similarity between
the extracted logistic regression model and the original
model. Larger ER indicates the similarity is higher, and
the extraction attack is thus more effective. Formally,
given the extracted logistic regression model f˜(x), the
number of tuples m and the i-th tuple xi,
ER =
1
m
×
m∑
i=1
I
(
f(x(i)) = f˜(x(i))
)
(19)
where I is an indicator function that equals 1 if f(x(i)) =
f˜(x(i)), otherwise 0.
• Extraction MSE (EMSE) measures the similarity be-
tween the extracted linear regression model and the
original model. Lower EMSE indicates the similarity is
higher, and the extraction attack is thus more effective.
Formally, given the linear regression model f˜(x), the
number of tuples m and the i-th tuple xi,
EMSE =
1
m
×
m∑
i=1
I
(
f(x(i))− f˜(x(i))
)2
(20)
B. Overall Evaluation and Comparison Result
We evaluate the HDG-protected linear and logistic regres-
sion models against using other differential privacy mecha-
nisms, i.e., MVG [4], DPBA [14] and BDPL [41], in terms of
utility and security. Among the three, BDPL is the only one
that can defend against the general model extraction attack for
binary classification models. So we only compare our scheme
with BDPL in the setting of logistic regression models. For
linear regression models, MVG serves as a comparison base
for it only fits this scenario. DPBA is suitable and used for
both models because it injects the noise into the cost function
during the training process. However, it not able to resist QPD
attack since the linear property of models still persists. We set
the default  = 1 for all mechanisms and the zone parameter
∆ = 18 for the BDPL. To unify the evaluation indicator, we
set SPB s = × n for the HDG mechanism, where n is the
number of model dimensions.
Utility. We send fine-tuned queries to the DP-protected models
and plot MSE and Accuracy as the functions of the num-
ber of queries r. In Fig. 4, the results show that MSE of
all mechanisms on the datasets Forestfires, GeoOriginal and
UJIIndoor fluctuates slightly as the number of queries grows.
It is worth noting that the MSE of the DPBA-protected model
is lower than the rest. This is because the DPBA only injects
the noise into the cost function and does not break the linear
relationship between the new queries and their corresponding
results. Except for DPBA, our HDG scheme exhibits better
model utility (lower MSE) than MVG, as it is impossible for
MVG to generate minimum noise by allocating the constant
privacy budget for each dimension by their experience.
In Fig. 5, we observe that the Accuracy of all mechanisms
exceeds 84% for the logistic regression model, which indicates
that the HDG-protected logistic regression models keep a
superb utility. Regardless of the number of queries, DPBA
and our HDG have almost unchanged Accuracy measurements,
about 90% and 86% respectively. However, the Accuracy of
BDPL reduces as the number of queries increases, especially
on datasets Mushroom and Bank. The reason behind it is: The
error produced by BDPL will gradually converge to a constant
if the privacy budget is constant. However, dataset Iris is too
small (only 100 instances). Consequently, the model trained on
this dataset might be underfitting and the Accuracy is about
84% at the beginning.
In summary, the model utility with our HDG scheme is
independent of the query numbers and shows performance
comparable to other state-of-the-art mechanisms for both lin-
ear and logistic regression models.
Protection against QPD Attack. We launch the QPD attack
to all DP mechanisms and plot the EMSE and the ER as
the functions of the number of queries r. We only compare
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Fig. 7. Protection Comparison of HDG on Logistic Regression
the EMSE of our design to the unprotected linear regression
model because of no known mitigation of model extraction
using differential privacy in this setting. Fig. 6 and 7 show the
protection provided by the HDG mechanism for the linear and
logistic regression models. The large gap between the EMSE
on NoPrivacy and HDG-protected linear regression models in
Fig. 6 shows that the protections of HDG on linear regression
models are outstanding and stable. The EMSE of the extracted
linear regression model with our scheme is greater than 15
on all three tested datasets, much larger than that of the
unprotected case. Fig. 7 shows that HDG provides excellent
protection for logistic regression models, since the ER of the
extracted logistic regression model is significantly lower than
that of the BDPL and NoPrivacy cases, i.e. only about 50%
with all datasets. Besides, the ER of our scheme remains
almost the same as the number of queries increases. On the
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Fig. 11. Protection Evaluation vs.  and ρ on Logistic Regression
other hand, the protection by BDPL dramatically decreases
with more queries (i.e. much lower ER than HDG). This is
due to the constant privacy budget used in BDPL while we
adopt group strategy, and compute different privacy budgets
and noise for different query groups.
C. Impact of  and ρ
We evaluate the utility and protection performance of the
proposed HDG mechanism with respect to different  and ρ.
In this experiment, we vary  from 0.2 to 1 and vary ρ from
1 to 2. Besides, we set the number of queries r to be the
maximum number in our experiments – 20k in order to reduce
the influence due to the lack of queries.
Utility Evaluation. To assess the utility performance with
different  and ρ, we send 20k queries to models and plot MSE
and Accuracy as the functions of  and ρ. Fig. 8 and 9 show
the utility evaluation of HDG-protected linear and logistic
regression models with varied  and ρ. Fig. 8 exhibits that the
maximum MSE of our mechanism is about 0.45 (in dataset
UJIIndoor), and the MSE decreases with the growth of  and
reduction of ρ, reaching the bottom when  = 1 and ρ = 1. In
Fig. 9, the Accuracy of the logistic regression model is larger
than 0.8 on all datasets. The Accuracy increases with a growth
of  and a decrease of ρ, reaching the summit when  = 1
and ρ = 1. In Fig. 8 and 9, the utility of the HDG-protected
models will reduce as the privacy budget decreases, which is
coincident with the definition of differential privacy. On the
other hand, the growth of ρ leads to the increment of distortion
degree. Hence, the utility will reduce as the ρ increases. In
conclusion, the utility of both models is maximized when  is
maximum but ρ is minimum.
Protection Evaluation. To see the influence of varied  and
ρ on protection, we plot EMSE and ER as the functions of 
and ρ. In Fig. 10, the EMSE reduces from over 17 to 15 as 
increases and ρ decreases, which means the similarity between
the extracted linear regression model and the HDG-protected
model is increasing. In other words, the protection provided
by HDG will reduce as  increases and ρ decreases. Fig. 11
depicts that the ER of the extracted logistic regression model
on three datasets is around 0.5, which means that the result
is almost random. From the perspective of information theory,
the disorder degree of the extracted logistic regression model
is maximum. As a result, the HDG mechanism provides better
protection than BDPL does.
D. Resilience Verification
In this section, we evaluate the resilience of our HDG mech-
anism. Resilience is a crucial property of HDG. It guarantees
that our HDG can provides a strong protection under the
misconfigured excessive large SPB s. To unify the evaluation
indicator as above, we still set the number of queries r to
be 20k, ρ = 2 and the SPB s =  × n in this evaluation. In
Table IV, we compare the EMSE and the ER among different 
for HDG-protected linear and logistic regression models. The
results demonstrate that with the reduction of , the EMSE
decreases to at least 14 for all datasets; the ER increases to al
most 0.63 for all datasets. In general,  is set to be a small real
number such as 1 or ln2, but the resilience evaluation results
show that even the SPB is large, our scheme still provides
good protection for linear and logistic regression models.
VII. DISCUSSION
The QPD attack is very powerful and can cause potential
damange to other DP-protected machine learning models.
For example, similar vulnerabilities may exist in regression
models, multiclass logistic regression models and multilayer
perceptrons. This is because the QPD attack can allow ad-
versaries to construct the true results corresponding to their
queries that could help them extract the models. Therefore,
it is worth continuing to study similar attack techniques,
which allows us to better understand the related vulnerabilities
and provides insightful guidance for corresponding defense
strategy development.
Although the proposed HDG mechanism is effective to
withstand the QPD attack, it also has some limitations. For
instance, the cost of the optimization process of HDG will
be expensive for high-dimensional models, which may not
be friendly to some time-sensitive applications. A potential
solution is to find the correlation among all dimensions of
the noise and reduce the optimization complexity. Another
limitation is that the presented countermeasure cannot be
easily extended to protecting other machine learning models.
This gives rise to an urgent call for investigations on the
development of QPD-resistant differential privacy techniques
and presents potential opportunities to the research community.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we develop a new powerful query-flooding
parameter duplication attack. By only accessing the public
APIs, the attack can effectively infer the private machine
learning models that are being protected by the state-of-the-
art differential privacy mechanisms. We analyze the cause of
the attack and propose a High-dimentional Gaussian mecha-
nism as the countermeasure for regression models. HDG can
produce the uncorrelated noise to disable the QPD attack and
automatically optimize the required noise to the minimum.
The scheme is also resilient to misconfigured privacy budgets.
The proposed attack and defense have been comprehensively
verified by experiments and will be made open-source for
further research.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. Assume that the training dataset contains n tuples and
each tuple is denoted by Xi = [x1, x2, ..., xd, y]. In order to
find a pair of neighbor datasets such that the sensitivity of
the linear model −ln( 1y − 1) = a1x1 + ...+ adxd + b trained
on them is maximum, we firstly algebraically transform each
attribute y to z = −ln( 1y−1). After normalization, the domain
of the training dataset is a d-dimension hypercube with side
length 1. Let the coordinate axis be (x1, ..., xd, z), and the
coordinate axis of the output attribute is z. Considering the
most extreme case, all data points are located at hyperplane
ox1x2...xd, and we propose a method to generate a pair of
neighbor datasets on this hyperplane as follows.
First we choose the vertex (1, 1, ..., 1, 0) as v1 on the
hyperplane ox1x2...xd and put (n − d + 1) data points on
v1, then we choose the neighbour vertex v2 of v1 and put one
data point on v2, next we choose the neighbor vertex v3 of v2
and put one data point on v3, etc.. Until we put the last point
on vertex vd. Let these data points be dataset DB, thus the
model fDB is
0× x1 + 0× x2 + ...+ 0× xd + 1× z = 0
Then we create the neighbour dataset DB′. We change a data
point on vd, and put it on another vertex that satisfies following
two properties:
1) z is equal to 1.
2) this vertex is the neighbour of a vertex which has at least
one data point.
At this time, the linear model fDB′ is:
0× x1 + ...+ 1× xi + ...+ 0× xd + 0× z = 1
Then the ∆2f between fDB and fDB′ is:√
(0− 1)2 + (1− 0)2 + (0− 1)2 =
√
3 (21)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. By the definition 8, we have a′i = ai×Γi. Thus, we can
construct the Type I privacy budget constraints for the query
group Qm by solving the bound of a′i = ai×Γi = |
Qim+N
iR
m |
|Qm+Nm| .
Referring to the Gaussian elimination and the property of
determinant, we rewrite the |Qm| and the Qim as follows.
|Qm| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x
(2)
2 − x(1)1 ... x(2)n − x(1)n
...
. . .
...
x
(n+1)
1 − x(1)1 ... x(n+1)n − x(1)n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣Qim∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x
(2)
2 − x(1)1 ... z(2) − z(1) ... x(2)n − x(1)n
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
x
(n+1)
1 − x(1)1 ... z(n) − z(1) ... x(n+1)n − x(1)n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where the vector z(j) − z(1) is at the i-th column.
Then, we enlarge the entries in Qm and Qim by 3 orders of
magnitude and get the enlarged matrix Qˆm. Hence, we have
a′i = ai × Γi =
∣∣Qim +N iRm ∣∣
|Qm +Nm| ≈
∣∣∣Qˆim +N iRm ∣∣∣∣∣∣Qˆm∣∣∣
Next, each entry in the matrix Qˆim+N
iR
m can be regarded as
a Gaussian variable following N (x(q)p , σ2p). Therefore, based
on Hadamard’s inequality [5] and 3-σ rule, we have
∣∣∣Qˆim +N iRm ∣∣∣ ≤
√√√√ n∑
q=2
[
zˆ(q) − zˆ(1) + 6σz
]2×
n∏
p=1,p6=i
√∑n
q=2
[
xˆ
(q)
p − xˆ(1)p + 6σp
]2
∣∣∣Qˆm∣∣∣
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4 is similar to that of Theorem
3. However, adversaries can only get the perturbed results z,
the a′i is equal to
Qim+N
i
m
Qm
, where N im is a noise column vector
on the i-th column. Referring to the minor expansion formula
and 3-σ rule, we have
ai × Γi ≤
∑n
j=1(z
(j) + 3σz)×Mji
|Qk| (22)
where Mji is the (j, i) minor of the original query matrix
Qi.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Proof. In the HDG mechanism, the density function of the
multivariate Gaussian noise is:
fX(x1, ..., xn) =
exp(− 12 (X − µ)TΣ−1(X − µ))√
(2pi)n |Σ|
and by the definition of differential entropy, the differential
entropy of multivariate Gaussian noise is
h(x1, ..., xn) =
1
2
ln(2pie)n × |Σ|
Thus, the magnitude of multivariate Gaussian noise is de-
termined by the |Σ|. The smaller the |Σ|, the smaller the
magnitude of the multivariate Gaussian noise. In our mecha-
nism, the noise in each dimension is independent, so we have
|Σ| = Πni=1σ2i .
Then we can write
|Σ| = Πni=1σi =
(
√
2ln( 1.25δ )×∆2f)n
Πni=1i
,
|Σ| only depends on the product of Πni=1i, the larger the
Πni=1i, the smaller the |Σ|. Next we use mathematical induc-
tion to prove the |Σ| is minimum when the variance of all ’s
is minimum.
Assume there are n privacy budget 1 ... n. First, when
n = 2, for privacy budget 1 and 2, the sum S = 1 + 2 is
constant. The product
1 × 2 = 1 × (S − 1) = S
2
4
− (1 − S
2
)2
so the product reaches maximum when 1 = 2 = S2 , and
V ar(1, 2) is the smallest at this time.
Then we assume when n = k the theorem holds, when
n = k + 1, we have
Πk+1i=1 i = 1 × ...× k × (S − 1 − ...− k),
let Sk = Σki=1i, because the theorem holds when n = k,
Πk+1i=1 i reaches maximum when:
Πk+1i=1 i = (
Sk
k
)k × (S − Sk),
Now let x = Sk, because k is a constant, we consider the
function
g(x) = xk(S − x),
because the maximum is at the point where the derivative is
0, then we have
g′(x) = kxk−1S − kxk − xk = 0
⇐⇒kS − kx− x = 0
⇐⇒x = Sk = k
k + 1
S
Thus
k+1 = S − x = S
k + 1
= 1 = ... = k,
and V ar(1, 2, ..., k+1) is the smallest at this time.
